Florida Law Review
Volume 33

Issue 5

Article 4

September 1981

Future Advances, After-Aquired Collateral, and Federal Tax Liens
in Florida--Toward a More Workable Solution
Margaret Matthews

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Margaret Matthews, Future Advances, After-Aquired Collateral, and Federal Tax Liens in Florida--Toward a
More Workable Solution, 33 Fla. L. Rev. 729 (1981).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol33/iss5/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Matthews: Future Advances, After-Aquired Collateral, and Federal Tax Liens

FUTURE ADVANCES, AFTER-ACQUIRED COLLATERAL,
AND FEDERAL TAX LIENS IN FLORIDA -TOWARD
A MORE WORKABLE SOLUTION
INRODUMrION

Future advance" and after-acquired collateral 2 agreements provide lenders
and borrowers with flexibility in arranging commercial financing. 3 Future advances allow lenders to disburse loans as the borrower requires additional funds
and secure them with the collateral from the original loan agreement.4 Contracts to secure loans with after-acquired collateral allow lenders to take security interests in property which debtors obtain after the loan is made.5 Future
advances and after-acquired collateral are often combined in arranging financing for business borrowers who might not qualify for traditional commercial

loans.6
The use of both future advances and after-acquired collateral is sanctioned
and controlled by article 9T of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).8 These
1. Future advances are extensions of cash or other credit made after the contract which
provides for them is executed. Dauer & Stern, U.C.C. §9-301(4) [1972] vs. LR.C. §6323(cXl)(A)
(ii) [1966], 8 U. TOL. L. REv. 51, 55 n.12 (1976).
2. A debtor may grant a secured party a security interest in a described type of property
which the debtor will subsequently acquire. This subsequently acquired property is termed
"after-acquired collateral." After-acquired property is usually relied on when the debtor has
fluid assets such as inventory and accounts receivable. See, e.g., Skilton, Security Interests in
After-Acquired Property Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 925, 926-27.
3. Lenders, courts, and legislatures seek to make available new sources of collateral and
methods of funding. Lenders using future advance clauses are usually merchants, bankers,
and factors. See, e.g., Comment, Priority of Future Advances Lending Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 35 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 128, 129 (1967). See generally, Oldfather, Floor Plan
Financing Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 14 U. KAN. L. RDv. 571 (1966).

4. U.C.C. §9-204(3). Most commercial lenders extend credit to their borrowers by making
advances from time to time instead of giving them a larger fixed amount all at once. See
Dauer & Stem, supra note 1, at 53.
5. U.C.C. §9-204(2). See, e.g., 1 G. GiLMORE, SECURTY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
§11.7 (1965).
6. See notes 34-36 and accompanying text infra.
7. Article 9 is entitled Uniform Commercial Code -Secured Transactions. U.C.C. §9-101.
The article contains a comprehensive scheme regulating security interests in personal property
and fixtures. It is intended to replace previous legislation, in the jurisdictions where it is
adopted, dealing with such security devices as chattel mortgages, conditional sales, factor's
liens, trust receipts, and assignments of accounts receivable. U.C.C. §9-101, official comment.
U.C.C. §9-204 provides: "(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a security agreement may
provide that any or all obligations covered by the security agreement are to be secured by
after-acquired collateral. (2) No security interest attaches under an after-acquired property
clause to consumer goods other than accessions (Section 9-314) when given as additional
security unless debtor acquires rights in them within ten days after the secured party gives
value. (3)Obligations covered by a security agreement may include future advances or other
value whether or not the advances or value are given pursuant to commitment. (subsection (1)
of section 9-105)."
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arrangements reduce the transaction costs that would otherwise be incurred in
9
the creation of several separate article 9 security interests. Article 9 requires
10
lenders to execute written security agreements and file financing statements
containing descriptions of the collateral in order to perfect their security interests.11 Complying with article 9 would often be complicated and expensive if
lenders had to re-file for every change in collateral, especially where it consists
of high-turnover inventory and accounts receivable.12 Using an after-acquired
13
collateral arrangement, however, eliminates the necessity of re-filing.
Future advance arrangements similarly avoid the expense of writing a new
security agreement and filing a new financing statement for every loan disbursement.1 4 Under these contracts one security agreement and filing will secure
Any other transaction which creates a security interest in personal property is also controlled by article 9. U.C.C. §9-102(l)(a). See, e.g., Mason v. Avdoyan, 299 So. 2d 603, 607 (Fla.
4th D.C.A. 1974) (finding the legislative intent was to have the U.C.C. control when it conflicts with previous law).
8. The U.C.C. is a comprehensive commercial code. The first official text appeared in
1952. The code is co-sponsored by the American Law Institute and the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Law, and controlled by a Permanent Editorial Board.
See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
§1-3 (2d ed. 1980).
9. See Jackson & Kronman, Security Financing and PrioritiesAmong Creditors, 88 YALE
L.J. 1143, 1166-67 (1979). The authors note that the after-acquired property device is a
transaction cost saver when collateral is of a type which rapidly changes. They further suggest
that after-acquired property clauses create a "situational monopoly" over other lenders but
admit that the problem is alleviated by the priority of purchase money security interests. Id.
10. U.C.C. §9-203(l)(a). Unless the secured party retains possession of the collateral, the
debtor must have signed a security agreement containing a description of the collateral. Id.
Although the security agreement must provide that after-acquired collateral or future
advances are contemplated, the financing statements need not explicitly so state. U.C.C. §9-204
Official Comment 5. See also In Re Fibre Glass Boat Corp., 324 F. Supp. 1054, 1056 (S.D. Fla.)
(security agreement covering inventory implicitly includes after-acquired property), aff'd per
curiam, 448 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1971); A.E. Nelson & Co. v. Haggett's Sport Shop, Inc., 120
N.H. 515, 517-18, 418 A.2d 1273, 1275 (1980) (description of collateral as "all inventory" was
sufficient to put parties on notice that after acquired property was intended).
I1. U.C.C. §9-402(1). The financing statement must contain the names of the debtor and
the secured party, give addresses, and describe the types of collateral. Id.
The U.C.C. adopted a system of notice filing rather than a strict recording system. The
filed financing statement is designed to put other creditors on notice that they should make
further inquiry of the parties. Notice filing has been of particular utility in financing transactions involving inventory and accounts since it relieves lenders from having to re-file for
each transaction. U.C.C. §9-402, official comment 2.
12. Without a device making after-acquired collateral effective security, floating liens and
modern open-end financing would be impossible. Skilton, supra note 2, at 927.
13. See, e.g., Grain Merchants v. Union Bank & Say. Co., 408 F.2d 209, 213 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom., France v. Union Bank & Say., 396 U.S. 827 (1969) (after-acquired
property clause allows lender to perfect security interest in after-acquired account by filing
one security agreement and financing statement); A.E. Nelson & Co. v. Haggett's Sport Shop,
120 N.H. 515, 517-18, 418 A.2d 1273, 1275 (1980) (financing statement and first security agreement were sufficient as a matter of law to attach and perfect a security interest in afteracquired inventory).
14. See, e.g., Estate of Cook, 64 Cal. App. 3d 852, 865-67, 135 Cal. Rptr. 96, 103-04 (Ct.
App. 1976) (lender's executed security agreement and filed financing statement perfected his
security interest in debtor's inheritance for later advances).
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the borrower's collateral for the first and any future advances.' 5 In the event of
6
default, however, problems arise in determining future advance lender's'
7
priority for the sums advanced after an intervening lien attaches.'
It is particularly uncertain whether commercial lenders who have made
future advances after a federal tax lien'8 has been filed can assert priority over20
the tax lien,' 9 where the lenders relied on after-acquired property as security.
Before 1966, the Internal Revenue Code provided that commercial lenders who
made advances or changed collateral after a tax lien was filed were always subordinated to the tax lien.2 ' The Federal Tax Lien Act of 196622 modernized the
Internal Revenue Code by excusing certain future advances 23 and afteracquired 24 property from the harsh rule of automatic subordination to government tax claims. Congress, however, provided that security interests for future
15. Friedlander v. Adelphi Mfg. Co., 5 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 7, 10 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1968) (a perfected security interest may vary as to amount due to future advances but
filing and agreement create one security interest).
16. The U.C.C. sets up a complicated system of priorities which ranks creditors' rights
to resort to the debtor's collateral. See U.C.C. §§9-301, 9-307, 9-308, 9-310, 9-312. See, e.g.,
J. WHr= & R. SUMMERS, supra note 8 at 1030-1083. See generally 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 5.
17. Future advances are likely to come into conflict with other interests because loan advances are often made without any investigation to determine whether other interests have
intervened. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 3, at 132-33.
Future advance lenders compete for priority with other secured parties, buyers, lien
creditors and federal tax Hens. Although the 1962 Uniform Commercial Code contained no
clear priority rules where future advances were concerned, the 1972 revisions included three
future advance priority subsections. See, e.g., R. HENSON, SECURED TRANSAcrIONS UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 98-110 (1972).
18. A lien for delinquent taxes is placed on all property, real and personal, of the taxpayer. I.R.C. §6321. Although the lien was originally superior to almost any interest, it can
now be defeated by a party who meets the strict requirements of I.R.C. §6323. See, e.g., Young,
Priorityof the FederalTax Lien, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 723, 722-26 (1967).
19. No security interest can be defeated by government tax lien priority until the tax
lien is publicly filed. I.R.C. §632(a). This rule removes the harshness of the "choateness"
doctrine which was imposed prior to the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966. See, e.g., Coogan, The
Effect of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 Upon Security Interests Created Under the Uni-

form Commercial Code, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1269, 1372-1281 (1968). For a thorough history of
the priority held by federal liens see Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious Careerof the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905 (1954) and
Kennedy, From Spokane County to Vermont: The Campaign of the Federal Government
Against the Inchoate Lien, 50 IowA L. REv. 724 (1965).

20. Congress severely limits the amount of after-acquired property which creditors can
reach once tax liens are filed. See Plumb, Federal Tax Liens and Priorities-Agenda

for the

Next Decade (Pt. 2), 77 YALE LJ. 605, 663-66 (1968).
21. See, e.g., United States v. R.F. Ball Constr. Co., 255 U.S. 587 (1958) (subcontractor's
assignment to surety of right to payment was unperfected and therefore subject to tax lien).
22. PuB. L. No. 89-719, §101, 80 Stat. 1125 (1966).
23. Only advances made without knowledge of the tax lien, secured by property acquired
by the taxpayer prior to or within 45 days after the tax liens were filed, covered by a written
security agreement, and protected under local law against a judgment lien will defeat the tax
lien. I.R.C. §6323(c). See generally W. PLUMB, FEDERAL TAx LIENS, 87-96 (3d ed. 1972).
24. Congress limits the subordination of tax liens to after-acquired property only if the
property is acquired within 45 days after the tax lien is filed. I.R.C. §6323(c)(2)(B). See generally Plumb, supranote 20, at 664-66.
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advances must have priority over lien creditors under state law to achieve
priority over the federal tax lien. 25 Unfortunately, the 1962 version of the
U.C.C. did not clearly establish the priority of future advances over intervening
26
lien creditors.
In 1972 the U.C.C. was revised to ensure that future advance claims supercede tax claims under local law, thereby receiving protection under the Federal Tax Lien Act. 27 The Florida Legislature rejected the 1972 U.C.C. revision
however, leaving future advancers in an uncertain position in priority disputes
with the government. 28 Florida case law nevertheless gave lenders with secured
9
interests in accounts receivable priority over all federal tax liens.2 The priority
status of Florida lenders relying on other than accounts receivable remains unclear.
The Federal Tax Lien Act also required that the security interest be in
"qualified" property in order to take priority over federal tax liens. 30 "Qualified" property is defined as that which the taxpayer owns or acquires within
forty-five days of the date the tax lien is filed. Case law indicates that even
lenders who check the files for tax liens every forty-five days may lose their
priority positions. 2 ' Congress could prevent such harsh results by creating a
25. I.R.C. §6323(c)(1)(B). The statute requires an advance to be "protected under local
law against a judgment lien arising, as of the time of tax lien filing, out of an unsecured obligation." Id.
26. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 3, at 132-30. See also Dawson, The 1972 Amendments
to Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code: Attachment and Enforceability, Future
Advances and Proceeds, 54 OR. L. REV. 251, 258-61 (1975). The sections of article 9 dealing
with priorities expressly establish their applicability to the future advance situation. U.C.C.
§9-301 granted priority to a perfected secured party over a lien creditor. U.C.C. §9-312 used
a first to file rule to determine priority between two secured parties. The unanswered problem, however, was whether the security interest for the second advance could be perfected by
the first advance. Comment, supra note 2, at 134-35.
27. See U.C.C. §9-301, official comment 7. The comment states that the new rule was
promulgated to supply an answer to the question of whether a security interest is protected
by local law, as is required by I.R.C. §6323(c)(2) & (d). The comment further provides that
the rule would probably not be significant in conflicts between actual future advancers and
intervening lienors but would be important in effectuating the congressional intent behind
the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966. Id.
28. The Florida Legislature amended Chapter 679 of the Florida Statutes on July 3, 1979,
effective January 1, 1980. The legislature adopted only one of the three future advance priority rules in FLA. STAT. §679.312(7) (1981).
29. See notes 136-174 and accompanying text infra.
30. I.R.C. §6323(1). Qualified property includes commercial financing security acquired
by the taxpayer before the 46th day after the tax lien is filed. I.R.C. §6323(2)(B).
31. See, e.g., Rice Inv. Co. v. United States, 625 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1980) (secured party
had no rights over government debtor-taxpayer's after-acquired inventory because lie could
not prove it was acquired within 45 days after tax lien); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. United
States, 466 F.2d 1040, 1049-54 (5th Cir. 1972) (lender with security interest in accounts receivable not entitled to defeat government's lien because performance on contract was not
complete within 45 days of tax lien filing), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929 (1972); Community State
Bank v. Midwest Steel Erection, Inc., 22 U.C.C. REP. SEv. (CALLAGHAN) 1059 (D.S.D. 1977)
(government entitled to account receivable arising after tax lien filing); Gold Coast Leasing
Co. v. California Carrots, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 3d 274, 280, 155 Cal. Rptr. 511, 515 (1979) (because debtor did not acquire collateral until after 45 day grace period, the government had
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new priority standard. For example, by fixing the secured amount as of the
forty-fifth day after tax lien filing and allowing the lender to have priority to
that extent regardless of when the property is acquired, Congress could more
appropriately shape the tax lien laws to fit commercial financing needs.
Commercial financers rely on future advance lending and after-acquired
32
collateral to reduce transaction costs and increase flexibility in financing.
Congress has promoted commercial lending by improving the priority of lenders using future advances and after-acquired collateral. 33 This note will explore
the necessity of the commercial lender's improved position and will suggest
further strengthening of the lender's position against government tax liens.
THE COMMERCIAL UTILrrY OF FUTURE ADVANcEs
AND AFER-AcQuIRED COLLATERAL CLAusES

Future advance lending arrangements promote commerce by making funds
34
available to borrowers who might be unable to secure traditional loans. Commercial lenders often employ future advance arrangements when lending money
to risky borrowers.3 5 Lenders may be willing to extend a series of smaller payments to borrowers whose credit or collateral is insufficient to justify a large
lump sum loan. Under a future advance arrangement, if the borrower uses the
first advance to the lender's satisfaction, further advances will be made. The
lender can thus reduce his total risk by ensuring that the borrower is applying
the funds to enhance the value of the collateral before distributing additional
funds. 8
Future advance arrangements have long been used in building construction
loans.37 This financing device has become significant for personal property
priority); Continental Fin. Inc. v. Cambridge Lee Metal Co., 56 N.J. 148, 265 A.2d 536 (1970)
(government has priority when disputed accounts are acquired later than the 45th day after
tax liens filed). But see Donald v. Madison Indus., 483 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1973) (change in
character of inventory more than 46 days after tax liens filed will not give government
priority).
32. See generally Oldfather, supranote 3.
33. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Texas Thermal Indus., 591 F.2d 1035, 1038 (5th Cir. 1979)
(new tax lien laws were response to problems old choateness rules caused lenders).
34. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 3, at 129-32. Borrowers can take advantage of future
advance lending if they are able to fund their businesses with funds received a little at a time.
Future advance lending schemes will be beneficial if: (1) the lender requires security due to
the borrower's poor credit rating, (2) the borrower owns property which the law allows to be
used as collateral, and (3) the collateral is valuable enough to cover the sum of all advances.
Id. at 129-30.
35. A creditor's risk is reduced by use of future advance lending because the lender can
restrict the availability of the loan amount while monitoring the borrower's use of the loan.
See The PriorityRule of Article Nine, 62 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 834, 864 n.127 (1977).
36. In open end financing, future advances are used with after-acquired collateral. Often
the current state of the debt, advances less payments, is correlated with the changes in the
value of the collateral. See Skilton, supra note 2, at 928.
37. See generally Blackburn, Mortgages to Secure Future Advances, 21 Mo. L. REv. 209
(1956); Moore, Seeking Firmer Ground: Mortgages to Secure Future Advances and the Priorities Quagmire, 12 SuFFoLK U.L. REv. 445 (1978); Urban, Future Advances Lending in North
Carolina, 13 WAKE FoPasr L. REv. 297 (1977); Comment, Mortgages to Secure Future Ad.
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lending as well. 38 Future advancers can provide working capital to a business in
return for a security interest in the business's assets. 39 Often a business's most
valuable assets are its inventory and accounts receivable. A working capital
advance, with the borrower's inventory and accounts receivable as collateral,
allows the business to obtain sufficient funds to continue operation. Maintaining operation enables the business to obtain more inventory and accounts receivable, and the lender can make further advances on the strenth of this additional collateral.
In addition to improving the flexibility and availability of commercial
financing, future advances reduce the transaction costs inherent in the extension of several separate loans. 40 Article 9 requires the parties to write a security2
agreement 41 and file a financing statement for every secured transaction.Lenders must search the files to be sure their borrowers have not previously
granted a security interest in the same property to another lender. 43 The expense involved in creating and assuring the validity of a security interest for
each disbursement in a series of loans would reduce the lenders' profit. The
cost could be significant enough to prevent the loan. When future advances are
used, however, only one security agreement and one filed financing statement
are required to protect lenders.- The effectiveness of protection for advances
vances: Problems of Priority and the Doctrine of Economic Necessity, 46 MISS. L. REV. 433
(1975); Note, Mortgages for Future Advances in Florida, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 565 (1962).
38. During World War II, financers began securing their loans on the strength of borrowers' rights under long-term contracts, accounts receivable and inventory. Unlike real property, the collateral changed and fluctuated and new problems accompanied the new forms of
collateral. Coogan, supra note 19, at 1376.
According to Gilmore, the law of future advances for personal property grew out of the
legal structure for the building construction loan. It was later adapted to working capital
loans which, like building constructions, do not require the receipt of one large sum at the
beginning of a project. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 5, §35.3.
39. Often referred to as floor planning, financers make advances to retailers and take
back a security interest in their present and future inventory and accounts receivable. See, e.g.,
Oldfather, supra note 3, at 571-75; Hillman, New Cases and Questions Under Article 9, 84
Com. LJ. 99, 101 (1977).
40. By providing for future advances in the security agreement, the parties are relieved
from the necessity of executing new security agreements for each sum disbursed to the borrower. See W. WILLIAMS, FLORID LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY,

§2.01(5)(c)(1) (1980).
41. See U.C.C. §9.203(l)(a). One of the requirements of attachment is that the parties
execute a signed security agreement containing a description of the collateral, unless the
secured party retains possession of the collateral. Attachment renders the security agreement
enforceable against the debtor and third parties. Id.
42. Filing is required for perfection in most cases. See U.C.C. §9-302. The proper place
for filing depends on the type of collateral. See U.C.C. §9-402.
43. Financing statements only need to include the types of property to be used as
security for the loan. The financing statement is intended to put other secured parties on
notice. See U.C.C. §9-402.
44. The section which makes future advances valid allows the security agreement to contain a clause about future advances but does not require this precaution. U.C.C. §9-204(3).
The official comment, however, indicates the drafters intended for the security agreement to
include such information. See U.C.C. §9-204, official comment 5. See also 2 G. GILMORE, supra
note 5, §35.5.
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made subsequent to an intervening lien has nevertheless remained unsettled. 45
The commercial utility of future advances would be harmed significantly if the
effectiveness of a single security agreement and financing statement were subordinated to an intervening lien. 40
Just as protecting future advancers provides an incentive for commercial
lending, commerce is encouraged by protecting lenders' rights to take security
interests in after-acquired collateral.47 Businesses whose capital consists principally of items such as inventory and accounts receivable will often not have
sufficient collateral to qualify for the loan unless after-acquired property is
used.48 Because lenders could not be sure such transient property would be
available upon default, lenders would refuse to accept accounts receivable and
inventory as collateral. 49
The utility of after-acquired property clauses is demonstrated by "floor
planning" arrangements.50 Floor planners use borrowed money to buy inventory
and pay operating expenses. The lender takes a security interest in the debtor's
inventory and accounts receivable6 1 When the borrower sells one item from the
inventory and replaces it, the lender's original security interest automatically
45. See, e.g., 2 G. GImmolm, supra note 5, §35.6. Gilmore reasons that a perfected security
interest followed by an advance under the same agreement only creates one security interest
and therefore defeats an intervening lien. Id. But cf. Coogan, supra note 19, at 1389-94.
Coogan argues that an intervening lien takes priority over a subsequent advance unless the
advance is made pursuant to a commitment. Id.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 99 S. Ct. 1448, 1564 (1979) (commercial
financers depend on state commercial law for reliable evaluation of the risks involved).
47. See, e.g., International Harvester Credif Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank, 296 So. 2d 82,
87-41 (Fla. 1974) (dissenting opinion) (decision limiting lender's right to after-acquired
property was harmful because security interests in after-acquired property are common and
necessary to modem finance).
48. Arrangements in which the creditor takes a security interest in all of a debtor's fluid
assets, such as inventory and accounts receivable, are often called "floating liens." See, e.g.,
Skilton, supra note 2, at 927. See generally Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code: PrioritiesAmong Secured Creditorsand the "FloatingLien", 72 HARv. L. Rav. 888, 867
(1959) [hereinafter referred to as Prioritiesand the Floating Lien]; Coogan, Intangibles as
Collateral Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 HAmv. L. Ray. 997 (1964) [hereinafter
xeferred to as Intangibles as Collateral]; Coogan & Gordon, The Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code Upon Receivables Financing- Some Answers and Some Unresolved Problems, 76

HAiv. L. Rv. 1529 (1968).
49. See Oldfather, supra note 3, at 572-78. Lenders relying on inventory cannot expect
borrowers not to sell since this would force borrowers out of business. After-acquired collateral and rights to proceeds abate the financer's risk of having his rights to the inventory
cut off by a sale. Id.
50. See, e.g., Frankel v. Associates Fin. Serv. Co., 281 Md. 172, 377 A.2d 1166 (1977) (read-

ing the security agreement in light of trade customs in floor planning, it is clear that the lien
extends to whatever inventory may exist from time to time).
51.

See, e.g., Reisman, What the Commercial Lawyer Should Know About Commercial

Finance and Factoring,79 Com. L.J. 146, 149-51 (1974). Commercial finance companies make
revolving loans in proportion to the value of accounts receivable, usually at 70-80 percent of

the face amount. Inventory of raw materials and finished goods is ordinarily only taken as
security in conjunction with accounts receivable financing, usually at 20-40 percent of the
cost. In floor planning for large items such as cars and appliances, financers investigate fresh.
ness, frequency of turnover, condition, maintenance, quality, and obsolescence. Id.
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attaches to the new property. 52 The value of the lender's interest in the collateral thus remains constant. Lenders benefit by making secured loans to
otherwise unqualified borrowers, and borrowers with no unencumbered property other than inventory benefit by the ability to obtain commercial loans.
Commerce is further encouraged by the transaction-cost savings inherent in
the use of after-acquired property clauses.5, 3 The U.C.C. requires a written
agreement between the borrower and the lender 54 and filing of a financing statement by the lender to protect his interest in the collateral. 55 A description of
the collateral must be included in the filed financing statement.56 In a situation
where collateral changes daily or even several times a day, the cost of re-filing
for every change in collateral would prohibit lenders and borrowers from meeting the U.C.C. requirements. Without after-acquired property clauses, lending
schemes relying on inventory or accounts receivable would not be commercially
feasible.
Federal tax liens pose a threat to future advance and after-acquired collateral agreements despite congressional attempts to alter the absolute priority
of tax liens. 57 The potential for subordination of a lender's interest in future
advances or after-acquired collateral thus reduces the utility of these devices
and encourages lenders to restrict financing to those businesses which have established credit. 58 The resulting limitation on businesses entering or continuing in the market could greatly damage modern commerce.
FEDERAL TAX LIEN Acr OF 1966
The Internal Revenue Code imposes a lien59 upon all property of the tax52. See, e.g., In Re Nickerson & Nickerson, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 93, 96 (D. Neb. 1971), rei/d
on other grounds, 530 F.2d 811 (8th Cir. 1976) (after-acquired inventory is automatically
covered by security interest in floor planning situation where collateral was inventory).
53. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 9, at 1166-67. One of the best advantages of afteracquired collateral is the transaction cost savings when the collateral is a type which changes
rapidly. Id.
54. See U.C.C. §§9-203, 9-204, and 9-204, official comment 5.
55. The financing statement need not refer to after-acquired property or further advances. U.C.C. §9-204 official comment 5.
56. U.C.C. §9-402(1). Only a description of the type of collateral contemplated is necessary to satisfy this requirement. Td. The U.C.C.'s use of notice filing instead of recording
makes a description of a type of collateral sufficient to perfect the creditor's interest. Further,
notice filing means one filing is sufficient to put the public on notice. Financing statements
are often filed before an agreement has been reached. See Oldfather, supra note 3, at 575.
57. The Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 was designed to dilute the government's superiority
over conflicting claims to the taxpayer's property. See, e.g., Young, supra note 18, at 723.
Before the Tax Lien Act of 1966, a lender's interest had to be choate in order to defeat the
priority of the tax lien. Choateness required the identity of the secured party be established,
the exact amount of the debt fixed, and the exact property included as collateral be established. Lenders could not allow a change in collateral or make an advance without checking
for a tax lien notice. Commercial finance involving daily changes in debts and collateral was
the area hardest hit by threat of tax liens. See Plumb, supra note 20, at 657.
58. Future advances and unusual forms of collateral are used to finance risky businesses.
See Comment, supra note 3, at 133.
59. I.R.C. §6321 states: "If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay
the same after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to
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payer with overdue e0 assessed 0' taxes. Prior to the Federal Tax Lien Act of
1966, the federal lien had priority over any property interest which arose or
changed after the deficiency was assessed. 62 Since the priority of the tax lien
was established by the assessment, which preceded the filing of the lienes a
conscientious lender who checked the records daily might make an advance
only to discover that a subsequently filed tax lien had priority over his security
interest.64 The government's use of tax liens therefore had a chilling effect on
commerdal finance e5
To enforce the tax lien's priority, courts developed a "choateness" doctrine"' to determine whether antecedent security interests had priority over tax
liens. A security interest was subordinated to a tax lien unless it was fixed at
the time the lien arose. 67 The choateness doctrine required the secured party
to establish clearly the identity of the secured party, the property subject to the
security agreement,6 8 and the exact amount of the debt. 69 The requirement that
the property be clearly identified prevented lenders from using after-acquired
collateral to defeat tax liens, 70 while the requirement that the exact amount of
the debt be identified subordinated future advances to tax liens.1 In United
tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall
be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property, whether real or personal, belonging
to such person."
60. See, e.g., United States v. Txigg, 465 F.2d 1264, 1267 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 909 (1978) (taxes assessed for failure to withhold income and pay taxes due under the
Federal Insurance Contribution Act).
61. Assessment requires a recording of the taxpayer's liability with proper records to
identify the taxpayer. See Comment, The Priority Afforded Secured Parties Until Notice of

Tax Lien Is Filed,11 GoNz. L. Rxv. 550, 552 (1976).
62. See, e.g., Coogan, supra note 19, at 1377. By changing collateral or making advances,
the secured party's interest would be rendered inchoate, and thus defeated. See note 57 supra.
63. See, e.g., United States v. R.F. Ball Constr. Co., 555 U.S. 587 (1958) (assignment by
taxpayer of money due on contract established inchoate interest which was subordinated to
later filed tax lien).
64. Before 1966, purchasers and some secured creditors had priority if their interests
arose before the tax lien was filed, but this group of secured creditors was more limited than
under the new Act. See Overman, Federal Tax Liens: A Guide to the Priority System of Section 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code, 16 B.C. INDus. & CoM. L. Rv.729, 739 (1975).

65. See, e.g., Coogan, supra note 19, at 1376. During the middle 1950's the Treasury increased its reliance on tax liens. Coogan theorizes that lenders were most likely to assess inaccurately their risk since many of the debtors had no income which could be taxed. The problem, however, was that those debtors were usually assessed for their failure to pay over income
tax and social security withholdings from their employees. Id.
66. See, e.g., United States v. R.F. Ball Constr. Co., 855 U.S. 587 (1958) (tax lien superior
to inchoate assignment); United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956) (tax
lien prior to mechanic's lien); United States v. Gilbert Assoc. Inc., 345 U.S. 861 (1953) (government had priority over competing inchoate lien); United States v. Security Trust & Sav.
Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 51 (1950) (priority given to government over attachment lien which was

inchoate).
67. See, e.g., Coogan, supra note 19, at 1373.
68. Thus, after-acquired property could never be included in a choate interest.
69. Future advances would subject the secured party to defeat by the tax lien.
70. See Coogan, supra note 19, at 1877.
71. See Plumb, supra note 20, at 657. Choateness prevented lenders from making futre
advances or accepting new collateral. Id.
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States v. R.F. Ball Construction Co.,7 2 the Supreme Court applied the choate-

ness doctrine to a security interest which had been created before a competing
tax lien arose.7 3 The Court held the security interest, though prior in time to
the tax lien, was not specific enough to meet the choateness test and was thus
4
subordinate to the tax lien7

Recognizing the harshness of the choateness doctrine,7 5 Congress amended
the tax lien statute by enacting the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966. The Act
codifies an altered form of the choateness doctrine. Under the Act priority is
granted to certain interests which would have been defeated under prior law, 6
and no interest is defeated which is established before the tax lien is publicly
filed.

7

7

The Internal Revenue Code now protects advances made within 45 days
after the tax lien is filed unless the creditor advances the sum with actual
knowledge of the tax lien.7M For an advance to come within this Internal
Revenue Code provision it must meet three conditions. First, it must be made
pursuant to a security agreement entered into before the tax lien was filed.79
This requirement is easily met because lenders routinely check for filed tax liens
before entering into security agreements. 80 Second, the creditor's interest must
be secured by "qualified" property.8 ' To be "qualified" property collateral must
be owned by the taxpayer when the tax lien is filed or be acquired by him

72. 355 U.S. 587 (1958).
73. Id. at 587. A subcontractor had assigned all sums due on his contract to a surety in
exchange for a performance bond. Id. at 588-89 (dissenting opinion).
74. Id. at 587. The per curiam opinion merely stated the instrument was inchoate and
unperfected. Id.
75. According to the Senate report, the legislators concluded that the old tax lien law
was too rough on commercial financing and recognized a need to provide some protection for
interests secured by inventories and accounts receivable. The legislators felt the financers
would be adequately protected by checking the record every 45 days. S. REP. No. 1708, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS 3722, 3729.
76. See note 71 supra.
77. I.R.C. §6321.
78. I.R.C. §6323(c) states:
"(I) In general - To the extent provided in this subsection, even though notice of a
lien imposed by section 6321 has been filed, such lien shall not be valid with respect to a
security interest which came into existence after tax lien filing but which (A) is in qualified property covered by the terms of a written agreement entered into
before tax lien filing and constituting (i) a commercial transactions financing agreement,
(ii) a real property construction or improvement financing agreement, or
(iii) an obligatory disbursement agreement, and
(B) is protected under local law against a judgment lien arising, as of the time of
tax lien filing. out of an unsecured obligation."
79. Careful lenders check for filed liens and financing statements before advancing any
money. See note 11 supra.
80. See id.
81. I.R.C. §6323(c)(2)(B) states: "The term 'qualified property,' when used with respect
to a commercial transactions financing agreement, includes only commercial financing security
acquired by the taxpayer before the 46th day after the date of tax lien filing."
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within 45 days after filing of the lien. 2 Lenders relying on after-acquired property have had difficulty bringing their collateral within this definition.8 3 Third,
the advance must be one which would be protected by local law against a
judgment lien arising at the time the tax lien is filed.8 4 Congress adopted this
requirement based on the assumption that it was satisfied once a security interest was perfected under the U.C.C.5
The Senate report accompanying the bill stated that the Federal Tax Lien
Act was influenced by changing concepts in commercial law and by the virtually
uniform adoption of the U.C.C.8s The report described the bill as a congressional attempt to limit the adverse effects of tax liens on evolving concepts
of commercial law such as future advances and after-acquired collateral.8 7 Unfortunately, the requirement that a security interest have priority under local
law over a judgment lien hindered this effort.8s Although Congress thought
this judgment lien test could be easily met, 9 it became problematic for future
advancers to meet it. Two distinct interpretations of future advance priority
under the judgment lien test developed under the 1962 version of the U.C.C.90
Future advance priority over federal tax liens consequently varied according to
the local interpretation of the U.C.C.91
FuTur1 ADVANCEs: PRIORITY UNDR
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

Lenders achieve priority92 over lien creditors under article 9 by perfecting- 3
their security interests before liens arise. Perfection is achieved by satisfying all
82. This xequirement has been criticized for being too harsh. See Coogan, supra note 19,
at 1417.
83. See, e.g., Rice Inv. Co. v. United States, 625 F.2d 565 (1980) (government claim preeminent since secured party could not prove inventory was acquired within 46 days); Texas
Oil & Gas Corp. v. United States, 466 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929
(1972) (bank's debtor's accounts receivable were not acquired within grace period, resulting in
government priority).
84. I.R.C. §6323(c)(l)(B).
85. See S. RP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19 66] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3722.

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Congress's intent was to conform the lien provisions of the tax laws to the concepts
developed by commercial law. Id. See also Coogan, supranote 19, at 1370.
89. In developing the Act, the Treasury Department insisted that security interests meet
some standard to defeat tax liens. For example, the creditor would have to establish that he
was protected by local law against the holder of a subsequent judgment lien arising out of an
unsecured obligation. Problems have occurred because the U.C.C. does not mention "judgment
creditors." It was also unclear under the 1962 Code whether non-obligatory future advances
were protected by local law against an intervening lien. See Plumb, supra note 20, at 659.
90. See notes 108-118 and accompanying text infra.
91. The Uniform Commercial Code has been adopted by 49 states, the Virgin Islands, and
the District of Columbia. J. WHm & R. SUMMERS, supra note 8, §1.
92. Priority gives a secured party the right to be the first one to satisfy his debt after the
borrower defaults. U.C.C. §9-504(l)(a), (b).
93. Perfection as well as attachment is necessary to protect the interest of a secured party.
Commercial financing usually is perfected by filing. U.C.C. §9-302.
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of the requirements for attachment 94 and filing a financing statement. 5 The
requisites for attachment are: (1) the lender must have possession of the collateral or the debtor must have signed a security agreement containing a description of the collateral, (2) value must be given, and (3) the debtor must
have rights in the collateral.!6 There is no specified order in which the requirements must be satisfied and perfection occurs when all requirements are met.97
The U.C.C. clearly provides that when a lien arises after a secured party has
perfected his security interest, the lien creditor is subordinate to the secured
party.98 The party with priority is not so clearly established, however, when
the secured party makes an advance after the lien is filed. 99
A hypothetical clarifies the situation.100 Suppose that on day one a lender
and a borrower execute a security agreement describing the collateral as the
debtor's $100,000 equipment. The lender then files a financing statement and
makes the first disbursement of $60,000. The security agreement provides that
further advances may be made at the option of the lender. Because all of the
requirements for attachment have been met and a proper financing statement
has been filed, the lender has a perfected security interest in the debtor's equipment to the extent of $60,000. On day 15 a lien for $40,000 attaches to the
borrower's equipment and on day 16 the lender, unaware of the lien, makes an
advance of $30,000 under the original agreement. In the event of default, the
equipment will clearly not satisfy both the lien and the security interest. A
battle therefore arises to determine whether the lien holder or the secured party
has priority in the equipment.'01
FutureAdvance Priority Under the
1962 Version of The U.C.C.
The 1962 version of the U.C.C. provides only that a lien creditor has
94. Attachment involves the satisfaction
execute a security agreement or the lender
value must be given. Third, the debtor must
order required; the security interest attaches

of three requirements. First, the parties must
must take possession of the collateral. Second,
have rights in the collateral. There is no special
the moment all three qualifications are fulfilled.

U.C.C. §9-203.
95. Perfection of an attached good may also be achieved by the lender keeping possession
of the collateral, or by qualifying under one of several temporary or automatic perfection
devices. See U.C.C. §9-302.

96. U.C.c. §9-203(1).
97. U.C.C. §§9-203(2), 9-303. A security interest is perfected when it attaches and the
required extra step, usually filing, has been taken. If the step is taken before attachment, the
security interest is perfected when it attaches. Id.
98. See U.C.C. §9-301. "Lien creditor" is defined as a creditor who has obtained a lien on
the property by attachment, levy, or the like. U.C.C. §9-301(3).
99. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 3, at 132-39. No explicit priority rule for lenders making future advances was contained in the U.C.C. Determination of priority vis-a-vis lien
creditors requires an analysis beginning with U.C.C. §9-301(l)(b). Id.
100. See similar hypotheticals in 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 5, at 935; Coogan, supra note
19, at 1390.
101. See, e.g., Earl Dubey & Sorts Inc. v. Macomb King Contracting Corp., 97 Mich. App.
553, 296 N.W.2d 582, 588 (1980) (bank filed and perfected its security interest, then made

advances).
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priority over an unperfected security interest. 0 2 The issue in the hypothetical
is thus whether the lender's second advance was perfected at the time the lien
was filed. Three of the requirements for perfection 03 were satisfied: a written
agreement containing a description of the collateral had been signed, the debtor
owned the property, and the lender filed a financing statement. Whether value
had been given for the second advance at the time the lien arose is undear. 04
If the first advance satisfies the requirement of .giving value, the lender has

priority over the lien creditor for the full $90,000.1o5 The lien takes priority
over the second advance, however, if some additional value is required to establish attachment and perfection of the second security interest.10 There are
theories to support either result. 0 7
One theory'0 finds two discrete security interests which must be perfected
individually. 0 9 The only way to protect a future advance from being subordinated to an intervening lien under this theory is to promise to make obligatory advances."10 The promise to make an obligatory advance satisfies the
requirement that value be given.:"' If all the other requirements for perfection
have been met, the security interest in the obligatory future advances is there-

fore perfected at the time that promise is made. If the lender retains the discretion to make advances, however, no value has been given. In the hypothetical,
the future advances were optional, thus the lien creditor acquired his interest
before the security interest in the second advance had been perfected. The lien
creditor would thus take priority over the lender's second advance. 2 Upon
disposition of the collateral,"3 the secured party would take $60,000 to satisfy
the debt for his first advance, and the lien holder would take the remaining
$40,000. No proceeds would be left to satisfy the second advance obligation.

A second theory, 1 4 however, suggests there is only one security interest that
102. U.C.C. §9-301(1)(b).
103. See G. GiLmoRE, supra note 5, at 35.6. Time of perfection is crucial to determination
of priority or subordination to a lien. Id.
104. See notes 115-118 and accompanying text infra.
105. The other three elements of perfection have been satisfied already. See U.C.C.
§9-203(1)(b).
106. See, e.g., Coogan & Gordon, supra note 48, at 1546-50.
107.

Compare I G. GmLaORE, supra note 5, at 935-49 with Prioritiesand the "Floating

Lien", supra note 48, at 866-68.
108. Professor Coogan is the force behind the "discrete interests" theory. He reasons that
the similarity between after-acquired collateral and future advances requires the two devices
be similarly treated by the law. Because after-acquired collateral cannot attach until the
debtor acquires rights in the property, Coogan maintains that the second advance should not
be perfected until value is given. See Prioritiesand the "FloatingLien", supra note 48, at 868.

109. The requirement that value be given is not satisfied for the second advance by the
value given in the first. See Coogan, supranote 19, at 1391-94.
110. The promise constitutes value and suffices to achieve attachment. See Coogan, supra
note 19, at 1391-94.
111. See Coogan, supra note 19, at 1391-94.
112. U.C.C. §9-301.
113. See U.C.C. §9-504. The secured party is allowed to sell or otherwise dispose of the
property and keep the proceeds to the extent of his expenses and the outstanding debt. The
second in priority has the opportunity to satisfy his debt next. Id.
114. Profesor Gilmore supports the "one interest theory." He finds the optional/obligatory
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is perfected at the time of the initial agreement. This initially perfected security
interest then fluctuates with the total loan amount. 115 Under this theory the
perfected security interest is said to "open up""16 to include later advances.
Because there is only one security interest, the U.C.C. does not require the
lender to give new value for the second loan distribution. This theory further
states 17 that the optional/obligatory distinction is meaningless since there is
no specific performance remedy for breach of the promise to lend money." 8
The lender in the obligatory situation could never be forced to make the second
advance. Accordingly, there is no reason to place the obligatory lender in a
position different from that of the discretionary lender.
Policy considerations supporting the protection of both secured lenders and
lien holders favor the conclusion that there should be one security interest
which opens up to include later advanced amounts." 9 Where the lien encompasses all of the debtor's property, as the tax lien does, the lien holder might
not be harmed by the future advancer's priority. 20 For example, if the total
value of all the debtor's property when the lien attaches is $100,000 and the
lender makes a $50,000 advance, then the value of the debtor's assets rises to
$150,000. There will be sufficient value in the property to satisfy both the
lender and the lienor if the borrower does not waste the advance but buys more
property with it.12' Although the lender takes priority to the extent of his advance, the lien holder is left in the position he was in before the advance. The
lien holder could further benefit from the advance where the advance enables
the debtor to complete a project which is valuable when finished but practically
worthless during production."22 For example, the debtor could be a manufacturer of a product consisting of relatively inexpensive materials which become
very valuable when assembled. A lienor whose lien attached while the materials
were unassembled would anticipate a small recovery. A secured party, unaware
of the lien, could advance the manufacturer enough working capital to corndistinction "conceptually" nonsensical. Distressed by the fact that the obligatory/optional
test has resulted in granting a great deal of judicial discretion, Gilmore stresses the need for
a "rule." 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 5, at §35.4.
115. This is the result achieved for 45 days after filing under §9-301(4).
116. See Skilton, supra note 2, at 928. Open-end financing is the name given to commercial financing by future advances and with changing after-acquired collateral. Id.
117. See note 114 supra.
118. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 5,at §35.4.
119. See, e.g., Friedlender v. Adelphi Mfg. Co., 5 U.C.C. REP. SEav. (CALLAGHAN) 7 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1968) (a perfected security interest on a first advance varies with amounts of later
advances); I G. GILMORE, supra note 5, at 939 (discusses that the lienor's position probably
will not be changed, unless made better); see Comment, supra note 3, at 139-44. A future
advance rule recognizing only one interest aids the infusions of capital into business enterprises which would not otherwise exist. The theory also encourages future advances to save
businesses from insolvency by salvage lending. Id.
120. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 5, at 939.
121. Id.
122. See Comment supra note 3, at 143-44. An adoption of the single security interest
theory encourages lenders to extend extra advances when a business becomes distressed. The
lender's decision is influenced by the fact that he will have priority for additional amounts as
well as past due ones. Id.
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plete the project. If the debtor defaulted after completion, the secured- party
would have priority to the extent of his second advance, but the lien holder
would have more valuable property with which to satisfy his claim.
The policy of encouraging commerce is also furthered by allowing future
advance lenders priority over intervening lien holders. 23 An advance might
permit the debtor to continue in business and in so doing generate enough
money to satisfy the lien and repay his debt to the lender. This result disrupts
commerce much less than forcing the creditor to resort to the collateral. 12'
Future advance lenders who are confident of their priority over intervening
liens are also more likely to enter into lending arrangements. If the priority of
advances was not established by perfection of the initial loan, lenders would
necessarily incur the extra cost of checking records before subsequent advances
were made. 1 25 The extra cost of being put in an unsure position against lien
creditors might be significant enough to prevent future advance lending.
FuTuRF ADVANCES: PRIOITY UNDER THE 1972

REviSIONS

OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

The Permanent Editorial Board of the U.C.C. promulgated revisions to
article 9 in 1972.126 One revision incorporated the theory that only one perfection is necessary for a future advancing secured party to defeat an intervening
lien holder. 27 The new section, 9-301(4), provides that a lien creditor takes
subject to a perfected security interest for advances made up to 45 days after
the lien. 2 1 The official comments to the section indicate that the purpose of
this addition was to effectuate Congress's intent that a perfected future advance
2 9
defeat a federal tax lien.
128. Congress realized that the tax liens were hindering the use of modern commercial
financing by threatening lenders' priority. The amendments were intended to bring the tax
laws in line with commercial practice. See Overman, supra note 64, at 788.
124. Because U.C.C. §9-504 allows expenses to be deducted and because such sales seldom
bring near a market price, continuing business becomes an even more valuable alternative to
disposition of the collateral.
125. Seenote 11 supra.
126. See J. Wms'E & R. SUmmERs, supra note 8, at 5. See generally Baker, An Overview
of the Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the Alabama Uniform Commercial Code, 42 ALA.
LAW. 51, 54 (1981); Bernstein, Another Look at the Article 9 Revisions -Some Specific Problems, 57 Cm. B. REc. 289 (1976): Carson & Woods, The Revisions to Article IX of the Uniform Commercial Code, 15 GA. ST. B.J. 120 (1979); Edmonds, A Synopsis of the Major Revisions to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code Adopted by Virginia, 8 U. RIcH. L. REv.
59 (1973); Funk, The Proposed Revision of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Pt. 1),
26 Bus. LAW. 1465 (1971); McDonough, Recent Statutory & Case Law Developments in
Secured Transactions,27 DRA E L. REv. 41 (1978); Turner, Nebraska's Adoption of the 1972
Amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 14 CaREIrrON L. REv. 99 (1980).
127. U.C.C. §9-801(4) states: "A person who becomes a llen creditor while a security interest is perfected takes subject to the security interest only to the extent that it secures advances made before he becomes a lien creditor or within 45 days thereafter or made without
knowledge of the lien or pursuant to a commitment entered into without knowledge of the
lien."

128. Id.
129. See U.C.C. §9-801, official comment 7. Official comment 7 states: "In this section,
because of the impact of the rule chosen on the question whether the security interest for
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In 1979 the Florida Legislature adopted most of the 1972 revisions 130 but
failed to include section 9-301(4). The omission requires Florida future advancers to argue that their priority is established under the theory that finds
only one perfection necessary to defeat an intervening lien.' 3 ' Florida lenders
may have to contend, however, with the argument that the legislature intentionally omitted section 9-301(4) to manifest clearly Florida's rejection of future
32
advance priority over intervening liens.2
Despite the absence of a clear priority rule in Florida's version of the
U.C.C.,"3 3 Florida courts will probably hold that perfected security interests
have priority over tax liens. This result is particularly likely because courts in
other jurisdictions have interpreted the judgment lien test to require only that
lenders have a perfected security interest in order to have priority over lien
creditors.134 The decisions do not require an additional perfection for each
advance. Florida future advance lenders are therefore probably not seriously
harmed by the omission of a clear priority rule.
THE UNIQUE POSITION OF FLORIDA'S
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE FINANCERS

Florida case law expressly gives lenders who rely on accounts receivable as
collateral complete priority over tax liens."35 In the pre-U.C.C. case of Peninsula
State Bank v. United States,13 the Florida Supreme Court found that lenders
relying on accounts receivable are always protected against judgment lien
holders because judgment liens cannot attach to accounts receivable in Florida. 137 The taxpayer in that case had assigned a contract to the lender as security for a loan under Florida's pre-U.C.C. accounts receivable statute."38 The
supreme court noted that the priority status of the tax lien was governed by the
future advances is 'protected' under Section 6323(c)(2) & (d) of the Internal Revenue Code as
amended by the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, the priority of the security interest for future
advances over a judgment lien is made absolute for 45 days regardless of knowledge of the
secured party concerning the judgment lien. If, however, the advance is made after the 45
days, the advance will not have priority unless it is made or committed without knowledge of
the lien obtained by legal proceedings. The importance of the rule chosen for actual conflicts between secured parties making subsequent advances and judgment lien creditors may
not be great; but the rule chosen for the first 45 days is important in effectuating the intent of
the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966."
130. Act of July 3, 1979, ch. 79-398, 1979 Fla. Laws 1966-2016 (currently codified in
scattered sections of FiA. STAT. §671 (1981).
131. See notes 114-118 and accompanying text supra.
132. See W. Williams, 1979 Seminar Notes, Secured Transactions In Personal Property
Under the U.C.C. Article Nine (Dec. 3 & 7, 1979) (lectures sponsored by D & S Publishers)
121-22.
133. See notes 130 & 131 and accompanying text supra.
134. See, e.g., United States v. Trigg, 465 F. 2d 1264, 1270 (8th Cir. 1972) (unfiled security
interest subject to government's tax lien because not protected against lien creditor).
135. See notes 136-173 and accompanying text infra.
136. 211 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1968).
137. Id. The statute subordinated the assignee's interest to "judicial liens" on the borrower's account at the time of assignment.
138. Act of June 16, 1947, ch. 24297, 1947 Fla. Laws 1443-47 (repealed in 1967).
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Internal Revenue Code, which provided that security interests arising after
notice of a tax lien take priority where local law would have protected the
security interest against a judgment lien creditor.. 39 Since Florida law did not

recognize a judgment lien against accounts receivable, the court reasoned the
assignee was protected by local law against a judgment lienor. The court found
the lenders were therefore entitled to funds owed the taxpayer-debtor on the

assigned contract despite the government's tax claim. 40
The Peninsula State Bank decision misinterpreted the Internal Revenue
Code's judgment lien test. By failing to analyze the legislative history of the
Tax Lien Act, 41 the court ignored congressional intention to protect perfected
security interests under local law against a U.C.C. lien creditor. The U.C.C.
defines a lien creditor as a creditor with a lien acquired by "attachment, levy, or
the like." 14 2 To be protected against a lien creditor, a secured party must perfect his security interest. 4 3 Cases have therefore generally held that a security
interest must be perfected to have priority over a tax lien.- 4 The Peninsula
State Bank court, however, found the lender's unperfected interest was protected by local law against a judgment lien because a judgment lien cannot at45
tach to intangible items such as accounts receivable..
Ironically, both the Florida court and the Tax Lien Act used the term

judgment lien incorrectly. 4 6 In Florida, as in most other states, 4 7 a judgment
lien only attaches to real property.'," The Internal Revenue Code clearly does
139. See I.R.C. §6323(c)(1)(B).
140. 211 So. 2d at 7.
141. S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN.
NEWS, 3722. The bill is an attempt to conform the lien provisions with the concepts of the
Uniform Commercial Code.
142. See U.C.C. §9-301(3). See generally Henson, Some Thoughts on Lien Creditors Under
Article 9, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 237; Murray, Executive Lien Creditors Versus Bona Fide Purchasers,Lenders and Other Execution Lien Creditors: Charles II and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 85 Com. L.J. 485 (1980).

143. U.C.C. §9-301(1)(b).
144. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Texas Thermal Ind., Inc., 591 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1979)
(perfected security interest has priority over subsequently filed tax lien); Dragstrem v. Obermeyer, 549 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1977) (unperfected security interest not protected by local law
and is subordinated to tax lien); In re Riss Tanning Corp., 468 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972) (perfected security interest defeats later filed tax lien); United States v. Trigg, 465 F.2d 1264 (8th
Cir. 1972) (unperfected security interest defeated by federal tax liens); George W. Ultch
Lumber Co. v. Hall Plastering, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 1060, 1067 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (unprotected &
unperfected security interest subordinate to tax lien); Fred Kraus &Sons, Inc. v. United States,
369 F. Supp. 1090 (1). Ind. 1974) (government had priority because interest not filed); General
Elec. Credit Corp. v. Isaacs, 90 Wash. 2d 234, 581 P.2d 1032 (1978) (because of a failure to
file a continuation statement, the creditor's interest lapsed into unperfection and was defeated by tax lien).
145. FLA. STAT. §56.061 (1981) limits property subject to execution to lands, tenements,
goods, chattels, equities of redemption in real and personal property and stock in corporations.
146. In attempting to use the literal definition of "judgment lien" as used in the Internal
Revenue Code, the Florida court actually applied the standard for execution liens. See note
145 supra.

147. See Henson, supranote 142, at 238.
148. FrA. STAT. §55.10(1) (1981) states: "A judgment or decree becomes a lien on real
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not use the term in its literal sense because the provision deals with personal
property security. 149 If priority over tax liens depends on security interests in
personal property being protected by local law against liens on real property,
50
the statute becomes senseless. 1
An argument can be made supporting the result in Peninsula State Bank
despite the court's faulty interpretation of the tax lien statute. The court should
have begun with the premise that Congress intended the term judgment lien
151
to mean lien creditor under the U.C.C. The court could have reasoned that
53
52
requires a creditor to levy
because the U.C.C. definition of lien creditor
on property, and because a creditor cannot levy on accounts receivable in
Florida,1 4 the secured party is protected by local law against such a lien creditor. The lien creditor could not defeat the secured party's interst, so the secured
party would have priority over the tax lien.
In Major Electrical Supplies, Inc. v. J.W. Pettit, Co., 155 a federal district
court followed Peninsula State Bank to hold an unperfected article 9 security
interest in a business's accounts receivable had priority over a federal tax lien
56
The government
because a judgment lien could not reach such accounts.
argued that the lender's failure to perfect the security interest subordinated the
1 7
The court noted that the
interest to a lien creditor under Florida's U.C.C.
filing requirement was intended to protect those who diligently check the files
5
before entering into a transaction with a debtor1 8 The district judge thus
concluded that the government was not entitled to the protection accorded
ordinary lien creditors 5 9 because it had not relied on the creditor's failure to
file notice of its interest when creating the tax lien.160
The Petit court's dismissal of the government's argument seems poorly
reasoned. The court could have considered either of two theories concerning the
government's position as a lien creditor.1 6' Other courts treat the government
estate in any county when a certified copy of it is recorded in the official records or judgment
lien record of the county, whichever is maintained at the time of recordation."
149. See Young, supra note 18, at 728-29.
150. See Dauer &Stein, supra note 1, at 64-65.
151. Coogan states that the I.R.C.'s judgment lien is comparable only to the U.C.C.'s lien
creditor. Furthermore, he notes that a security interest is not protected against a lien creditor
until attachment and filing. See Coogan, supra note 19, at 1382-83.
152. See U.C.C. §9-301(3). See also Ward, Ordering the Judicial Process Lien and the
Security Interest under Article Nine: Meshing Two Different Worlds- Secured Parties and
Post-Judgment Process Creditors, 31 ME. L. Rav. 223, 234 (1980). A lien creditor under the
U.C.C. must have acquired a lien by some statutory procedure like execution and levy, attachment or "a similar lien-generating process." Id.
153. See note 145 supra.

154. Id.
155. 427 F. Supp. 752 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
156. Id. at 755.
157. Id.
158. Id. The court went even further to say that such a failure would allow a lien
creditor to take priority over the secured party. Id.
159. Id. The court stated that the government had not given up anything of value in
reliance on the records and could not use the failure to file to gain priority.
160. Id. at 752.
161. See notes 162-167 and accompanying text infra.
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as either an actual 162 or a hypothetical 163 lien creditor. Jurisdictions using a
hypothetical lien creditor test consider what protection state law affords security interests over any lien creditor, including the government. 4 In the jurisdictions using an actual lien creditor theory,165 the government's lien takes
priority over unperfected security interests only if the government has no

knowledge of the security interest. This lack of knowledge requirement is
based on the fact that lien creditors have historically been required to demonstrate they were unaware of the unperfected security interest to get priority

over such interests.166 The 1972 revisions to the U.C.C. diminished the distinction between the two theories by removing the requirement that lien creditors
have no knowledge of prior security interests to take priority. 6"
By treating the government as either a hypothetical or an actual lien creditor, the Petit court could have more faithfully adhered to the statutory language of the Internal Revenue Code's judgment lien test. 68 The test requires
an examination of the legal status of a secured party in relation to a lien holder
under local law. 6 9 The Petit court instead found that the government was not
entitled to the protection granted to lien holders.170 The court could have arrived at the same result by considering the security interest's priority over
ordinary lien holders and thereby concluding that the tax lien was subordinate
to the security interest. As in PeninsulaState Bank, 7 1 the court could have relied on the protection accorded the secured party by local law against a lien
creditor since judgment liens cannot reach accounts receivable in Florida. 72
The narrow holdings of the two Florida tax lien cases' 73 protect future advances against tax liens when the collateral is accounts receivable. Unfortunately, however, it is unclear whether courts will use the lien creditor test to
determine the priority of future advance lenders with tangible collateral.
Florida courts will probably follow the other jurisdictions by finding that only

perfected security interests have priority over tax liens."74
162. See, e.g., United States v. Ed Lusk Constr. Co., 504 F.2d 328, 331 (10th Cir. 1974) (due

to imperfectly filed financing statement, the government has priority because there is no
constructive notice).
163. See, e.g., Dragstrem v. Obermeyer, 549 F.2d 20, 26 (7th Cir. 1977) (government
treated as having legal status of lien creditor).
164. See, e.g., Manalis Fin. Co. v. United States, 611 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1980) (perfected
security interest establishes priority of secured party).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Trigg, 465 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1972) (unfiled security
interest loses to government since government had no knoledge of the interest).

166. U.C.C. §9-301(1)(a) [1962] states that an unperfected security interest is subordinate
to a lien created "without knowledge" of the security interest.
167. See U.C.C. §9-301(1)(b) [1972]. The new statute does not require the superior claimant
to be without knowledge of the security interest.

168. See I.R.C. §6323(c)(1)(B).
169. See, e.g., Dragstrem v. Obermeyer, 549 F.2d 20, 26 (7th Cir. 1977) (reasoning that the
legislative history indicates the government meant a lien creditor).
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

427 F. Supp. at 755.
See notes 151-154 and accompanying text supra.
FLA. STAT. §55.081 (1981).
The cases only apply to property which is not subject to levy.
See note 144 supra.
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AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY AND PRIORITY
OvER THE TAX LIEN

In addition to the requirement that a security interest be protected by local
law, the Internal Revenue Code states that the security interest will not defeat
a tax lien unless secured by qualified property. 175 Property is deemed qualified
if it is owned by the debtor-taxpayer at the time the tax lien is filed or if the
debtor-taxpayer acquires ownership within forty-five days after the tax filing.
The forty-five day limit has replaced the choateness rule which formerly determined interests in after-acquired property under the priority scheme set up
by the Federal Tax Lien Act.176
The legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress intended to relieve
lenders of the burden and expense associated with having to check the public
files every day to protect their priority. 177 The Senate report on the Act states
the legislative expectation that a lender would be protected as long as the
records are searched once every forty-five days. 178 Realistically, however, a
lender relying on after-acquired collateral must check the files every day to
protect his interest in the collateral. A lender who does not discover the tax
lien until the forty-fifth day could be left without any collateral if the borrower has failed to apply incoming funds to reduce the secured debt and there
are insufficient currently-owed receivables. 17 Debtors may similarly waste inventory and fail to replace it within forty-five days. Such action is likely because
debtors against whom tax liens have been filed are undoubtedly financially
distressed. 1 0
In a recent Fifth Circuit case,""' a lender argued that inventory which the
debtor bought to replace inventory held during the forty-five day grace period
should be immune from the government's tax lien.' s The Fifth Circuit flatly
rejected the lender's theory that inventory replacement comes within the definition of qualified property.8 3 In similar cases, other courts have denied lenders
priority to collateral acquired more than forty-five days after a tax lien has
been filed.' 8 4 The harshness of the results in these cases indicates that lenders

175. I.R.C. §6323(c)(1)(A).
176. See, e.g., Overman, supra note 64, at 738.
177. The Senate Report states its goal is to keep the obligation to search within reasonable bounds by giving financers a 45 day leeway. S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3722, 3729.
178. S. REP. No. 1708, 89th CONG., 2d Sess., reprinted in, [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3722, 3729. The qualified property doctrine "gives an inventory or accounts receivable

financier assurance that his loans or purchases are not inferior to some recently filed tax lien
as long as he searches the records at least once every 45 days." Id.
179. See, e.g., Coogan, supra note 19, at 1417. Coogan argues that forty-five days is not
long enough to allow parties in a distressed financial situation to work out their problems. Id.
180. See note 65 supra.
181. Rice Inv. Corp. v. United States, 625 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1980).
182. Id. at 572.
183. Id. Basing its decision on the clear language of the statute, the court insisted that
the lender must rely on Congress for help, and not on the courts. Id.
184. See note 31 supra.
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have not received the protection from tax liens contemplated by the proponents
of the Tax Lien Act.
Congress could further its goal of promoting commerce by changing the
qualified property standard. The tax laws should be amended to allow secured
parties to retain priority for property that replaced the original collateral. The
status of tax liens would be protected by limiting the lender's priority to the
value of the secured debt on the earlier of either the forty-fifth day after the
tax lien is filed or the date the lender obtains actual knowledge of the tax lien.
Protecting lenders from subordination to tax liens by extending lenders' security interests to replacement collateral would achieve Congress's original intent
in promoting inventory and accounts receivable financing. 85
CONCLUSION

Creative and flexible financing is a valuable key to promoting commerce.
Future advance and after-acquired collateral agreements serve as workable
financing devices for risky borrowers and supply working capital to borrowers
with no unencumbered property other than inventory or accounts receivable. 8 6
Financers require a method of protecting their security interests from the threat
of defeat by tax liens. Unfortunately, future advances and after-acquired collateral are vulnerable to defeat by tax liens despite efforts by Congress and
commercial law experts to reduce the risk. 8 7
Although the Florida legislature has left future advance lenders without
clear priority over tax liens, the courts will probably rectify this omission.88
Cases in other jurisdictions present a clear analysis of the lien creditor test
which Florida courts will likely follow. 8 9 This test would ensure that a security
interest perfected at the time of the first advance would be sufficient to defeat
an intervening tax lien.
In addition, the tax lien laws should be revised. Congress should amend the
qualified property definition to protect replacement collateral. 190 By enabling
lenders to recover the full amount of the debt whenever the property has sufficient value, Congress could encourage financers to make more loans relying on
after-acquired property.
MARGARET MATHEWS
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

See note 178 supra.
See Skilton, supra note 2, at 925-27.
See notes 75-84 and accompanying text supra.
See text accompanying note 5 supra.
See note 144 supra.
See notes 177-185 and accompanying text supra.
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